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I. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
A. TWO CASES, ONE THEME
Exactly one year apart, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases
on “class arbitration” proceedings, one about international shipping
and the other on consumer purchases of mobile telephones. Each
decision inflicted damage on a claimant’s right to invoke collective
action in arbitrations. Read together, the opinions serve as a prism
through which to refract key elements in an increasingly politicized
debate on the legal framework for arbitration, particularly within the
United States.
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, an arbitral tribunal had been
constituted to hear antitrust claims arising from maritime agreements
for transport of liquids such as food oils and chemicals.1 Asked to
interpret a series of charter parties negotiated by experienced
business managers, the tribunal rendered a unanimous award saying
that the contract language permitted class proceedings. Having
determined that the agreements authorized class arbitration, the
arbitrators’ next job would have been to determine whether the case
should in fact go forward on that basis, an exercise involving
evaluation of various criteria, such as the existence of common
questions of law and fact, relevant to the appropriateness of class
rather than bilateral action. Only then would the tribunal proceed to
rule on the merits of the claims.
The arbitrators never got the chance to take the next steps,
however. A majority of the Supreme Court decided that by
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
Opinion by Justice Alito joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.
Dissent by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens. Justice
Sotomayor took no part in the case, having been on the Second Circuit during the
appeal, but later joined the dissenters in another decision about arbitral jurisdiction,
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). This latter case did not involve
class proceedings, but rather allocation of authority between arbitrators and courts
in deciding the validity of an arbitration clause in an employment contract that the
worker said was unconscionable. An opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Roberts, Alito, Thomas and Kennedy, held the challenge to be a matter for the
arbitrator. A dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and
Sotomayor, argued that the matter lay within the purview of courts.
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construing the contracts as having authorized class arbitration, the
arbitral tribunal exceeded its authority. The award was then
remanded to the lower court to be vacated.2 For the majority,
respondents’ failure to consent to class proceedings trumped any
efficiency benefits from collective arbitration such as the sharing of
costs that might otherwise inhibit pursuit of claims.
Twelve months later, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the same
Court addressed arbitration arising from a federal court action
brought by consumers against the manufacturer of cellular
telephones.3 The standard-form sales contracts provided for
arbitration, but prohibited class proceedings. Relying on an earlier
California judicial ruling striking down such prohibitions as
unconscionable, the lower federal courts refused to compel
arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that state rules
barring class action waivers ran afoul of federal law.4
Vigorous dissents were issued in each instance. In Stolt-Nielsen
the dissenters contended that the arbitral process had not yet reached
a point ripe for judicial review. Moreover, the arbitrators were
simply doing what the parties instructed them when designating the
AAA Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration as the framework
for the arbitration. In AT&T Mobility, the dissent authored by Justice
Breyer stressed the advantages of class arbitration, and argued that
the California rule on waivers fell within the role accorded to state
2. A federal district court had initially vacated the award for “manifest
disregard of the law,” but was then reversed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Although accepting that “manifest disregard” existed as a ground for
annulment, the Court of Appeals considered that the standard had not been met
under the facts of the instant case.
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Alito, Thomas and
Kennedy. The dissent by Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan. Following Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Kagan had been appointed
by President Obama to succeed Justice Stevens, who had earlier expressed serious
concerns about arbitration in a dissent in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 666 (1985).
4. AT&T Mobility at 1753. The majority’s reasoning was adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 637 F.3d 947 (2012), in which the court
held that a California law prohibiting arbitration of claims for public injunctive
relief was not a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,” and was accordingly preempted to the extent that it purported to
invalidate agreements to arbitrate such claims.
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law in determining the validity of arbitration agreements.
The comment triggered by these cases has explored the dispute
resolution’s fairness, a capacious notion that incorporates a
responsibility to hear before deciding (due process), respect for the
contours of arbitral jurisdiction (whether imposed by contract or
public policy) and the general duty of impartiality and
independence.5 Controversy has addressed not only the fairness of
the format for adjudication, whether collective or bilateral, but also
that of the forum, whether public courts or private arbitration.6

B. POLITICS AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
The ideological overtones of these two decisions will not escape
careful observers, aware of how class arbitration in the United States
tends to implicate passions associated with “business vs. consumer”
conflicts. Indeed, shortly after AT&T Mobility, the New York Times
carried a scathing editorial describing the decision as “a devastating
blow to consumer rights” that would “bar many Americans from
enforcing their rights in court [and in many cases] from enforcing
rights at all.”7
In the context of current American political debate, four of the five
judges striking down the award in Stolt-Nielsen, and confirming the
class waivers in AT&T Mobility, would be described as conservative:
Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia and Thomas.8 The dissents came from
Court members all of whom would be considered to the left of those
in the majority: Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer and Sotomayor,
along with Justice Kagan, whom President Obama appointed to
5. See generally William W. Park, Les devoirs de l’arbitre: ni un pour tous, ni
tous pour un, 2011 CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE 13 (2011).
6. See generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract:
The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 (2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the
Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011). See also
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011), exploring
class proceedings in court as well as arbitration.
7. Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, 12 May 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html.
8. In each case they were joined by Justice Kennedy, often deemed a centrist
swing vote.
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succeed Justice Stevens after his retirement.
Normally inclined to endorse arbitration as consistent with
freedom of contract,9 the right side of the American political
spectrum remains skeptical about class proceedings, seen as a tool of
lawyers taking cases on a contingency basis for a portion of the
judgment or settlement. By contrast, for those thought of as leaning
to the left politically, class actions present themselves as a
mechanism to promote consumer and employment claims which,
because of the small individual recovery, might not otherwise be
brought either in court or in arbitration.
Support of class action arbitration does not necessarily mean
satisfaction with arbitration itself. Within the United States,
complaints against arbitration of consumer and employment disputes
have been raised not only by journalists, but also by legal scholars in
popular as well as academic literature. Arbitration has often been
portrayed as a way to sidestep the perceived safeguards of a civil jury
in favor of more “pro-business” arbitrators.10 A quarter century ago,
in the landmark Mitsubishi decision allowing arbitration of anti-trust
claims, a dissent by Justice Stevens declared that “[c]onsideration of
9. For comment on arbitration by a scholar usually associated with the “law
and economics” movement, see Eric A Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization
of International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647 (1999). See also Eric A
Posner, Should International Arbitration Awards be Reviewable, 94 AM. SOCIETY
INT’L LAW PROC. 126 (2000), suggesting that courts “should not review arbitration
awards except to ensure that arbitrators have jurisdiction and do not violate
mandatory legal rules.” Professor Posner continues that nothing in his analysis
turns on whether arbitrators are better or worse than courts sin general, but rather
what is important is that “parties have the freedom to choose between arbitration
and courts.” In what appears as an article of faith he adds, “If they have this
freedom, they will simply choose the superior forum.” Id.
10. See Amalia D. Kessler, Op-Ed., Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, 7 March
2012, at A27. Professor Kessler argues that “arbitration decisions do not need to be
based on the law; arbitrators have their own procedures, and some studies have
found that they are systematically biased in favor of the companies that hire them,”
and that “ordinary citizens are increasingly being forced into arbitration under the
guise of free contract.” Id. Compare Thomas Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer
Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 991 (2012), in which the author proposes “a
public rating system assessing the fairness of arbitration programs associated with
contracts for consumer goods or services, or individual employment contracts—
what we call an ‘Arbitration Fairness Index.’”
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a fully developed record by a jury, instructed in the law by a federal
judge, and subject to appellate review, is a surer guide to the
competitive character of a commercial practice than the practically
unreviewable judgment of a private arbitrator.”11
Resistance to arbitration from the liberal side of the aisle has also
worked its way into legislation reducing the vitality of arbitration
clauses in consumer and employment contracts.12 Notably, the
pending Arbitration Fairness Act provides that “no pre-dispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, or civil
rights dispute.”13 The bill’s preamble includes a proposed finding
that “decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have
changed the meaning of the [Federal Arbitration] Act” so that it now
extends to consumer and employment disputes in a way that
“undermines the development of public law because there is
inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of
arbitrators’ decisions.”14
Politicization of arbitration in the United States derives in large
measure from two idiosyncrasies of American legal culture. The first
lies in the absence of any general nation-wide statute to insulate
consumers and employees from abusive arbitration arrangements.
The second rests in the availability of civil juries to decide ordinary
contract cases. Arbitration thus commends itself to those with doubts
about the reliability of such juries, often perceived as rendering
unreasonable verdicts tainted with bias against manufacturers and
employers.15

11. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 666 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223. See also Department of Defense
Regulation Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R.
§§ 212, 222, 252 (2010).
13. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 402 (introduced 12
May 2011 by Sen. Franken). See also Department of Defense Regulation
Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. §§ 212, 222,
252 (2010).
14. Id.
15. For an intriguing case on the law applicable to determination of whether
class actions are permissible even outside the arbitration context, see Shady Gove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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With greater or lesser degrees of nuance, political scientists and
journalists attempt to chart the ideology on judicial decisions, in the
sense that certain judges tend to vote together.16 The so-called
“Martin-Quinn Scores” use a scale with negative numbers translating
to liberalism and positive numbers translating to conservatism. Thus
Justice Douglas, considered a very liberal judge, received an average
ideological score of minus 4, while a score of positive 4.30 was
accorded the conservative Justice Rehnquist.17
Less successful has been the establishment of any intellectually
rigorous way to connect the dots among the disparate questions that
work their way into the right-left debate, such as criminal procedure,
competition law, health care, taxes, gun control, a Christmas crèche
on the village green, campaign finance, affirmative action, gay
marriage, and abortion. Notions of being a “fiscal” rather than a
“social” conservative, which appeal to many Americans, provide
some refinement on the theme, while still leaving open what exactly
makes a position left or right.18
16. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). Explaining the “attitudinal”
model of Supreme Court decisions, the authors venture, “Simply put, Rehnquist
votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the
way he did because he was extremely liberal.” Id. at 86. For a journalist’s take, see
Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES,
July
25,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?
pagewanted=all.
17. See generally Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, & Lee Epstein, The Median
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); Lee Epstein,
Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey Segal, Ideological Drift among Supreme
Court Justices: Who, When and How Important, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007);
Lee Epstein, Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 99 (2008). For
comment on the Martin-Quinn scores, see Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of
Martin-Quinn Scores to Asses Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to
the Problem of Ideological Draft, 101 NW. L. REV. 1891 (2007). See also Ward
Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005).
18. Traditionally, American conservatives would have seen themselves as
cautious toward change, claiming hallmarks of small government and free
enterprise as exemplified in classic works by William F. Buckley (GOD AND MAN
AT YALE, 1952) and Barry Goldwater (CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE, 1960).
By contrast, liberal figures such as Kingman Brewster and William Sloane Coffin
would claim trademarks as advocates for greater social and economic equality. See
generally Geoffrey Kabaservice, THE GUARDIANS (2004); Warren Goldstein,
WILLIAM SLONE COFFIN JR. (2004). Of course, such characterizations suffer in the
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Likewise, it is less than self-evident how such inclinations have
come to figure so prominently in the area of arbitration, with its
protean quality of changing from context to context. The choice to
arbitrate, rather than proceed to otherwise competent courts, justifies
itself differently depending on whether the final and binding private
adjudication relates to labor disputes, construction contracts,
commercial transactions, international finance, or investor
allegations of host state expropriation, to mention just a few of
arbitration’s incarnations.
The elusiveness of political categories in arbitration also manifests
itself through inter-temporal shifts from one generation to another. A
half century ago, liberal judges tended to wax eloquent about the
benefits of arbitration, in the context of labor disputes19 or
construction cases,20 providing many “pro-arbitration” passages that
have since become locus classicus. In all instances, labels remain
highly sensitive to cultural and geographical context. The bar to
arbitration of consumer disputes, while radical in the United States,
has long been the norm in Europe.21
The complexity of arbitration’s political ideology also presented
itself in the investor-state dispute resolution provisions of the U.S.current world of “neoconservatives” and the Occupy Wall Street movement, with
some traditional conservatives lamenting a movement hijacked by oversimplified
capitalism and imprudent foreign adventure, and some on the left worrying that
protest movements lack focused programs.
19. See the opinions by Justice Douglas, a classic liberal, in the “proarbitration” decisions in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) and the so-called “Steelworkers Trilogy,” which includes United
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564; United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1
(1983), where Justice Brennan, considered a liberal, wrote for the majority which
ordered arbitration, while the dissent was penned by Justice Rehnquist, a
conservative.
21. The European Union has long restricted consumer arbitration. European
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, implemented through national legislation such as
the English Arbitration Act of 1996, §§ 89-91. Even apart from the EU Directive,
many European countries restrict consumer arbitration by statute. In France, a predispute clause compromissoire (contrasted to the post-dispute compromis) has long
been valid only as between merchants (commerçants) or persons contracting with
respect to a professional activity. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2061 (Fr.).
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Korean Free Trade Agreement, contested by the South Korean left
but likely to appear progressive to those living north of the 38th
parallel.22 After the ruling conservative Saenuri Party succeeded in
having the Free Trade Agreement adopted in late 2011, the more
liberal opposition proposed renegotiation of the treaty’s investorstate arbitration provisions, arguing that arbitration’s alleged
impartiality was more illusion than reality. 23

C. ENTER INVESTOR PROTECTION
A few months after the decision in AT&T Mobility, the tribunal in
an international arbitration known as Abaclat rendered a
jurisdictional award which wrestled with similar questions about
class arbitration.24 The claims had been brought by an association
acting as agent for approximately sixty thousand Italian
bondholders,25 including some added after the claims were initially
filed, dissatisfied by Argentine debt restructuring following the 2001
economic crisis.
Filed pursuant to the Italian-Argentine investment treaty, the
22. See generally Chung Min-uck, Opposition Pledges to Scrap KORUS FTA
After Taking Power, KOR. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2012/02/116_104431.html.
23. Discussion focused inter alia on the 1998 NAFTA arbitration in the
Loewen case, which rejected a Canadian request for compensation in connection
with a Mississippi state court trial generally considered xenophobic from start to
finish. One Korean press report cited political pressure on Abner Mikva, an
arbitrator in the Loewen case, by a U.S. Justice Department official who suggested
that the arbitral tribunal should deny liability because “if we [the United States]
lose this case we would lose NAFTA.” Jung Eun-joo, Unearthed Documents
Illustrate Pitfalls of ISD Clause, HANKYOREH, 3 January 2012, English.hani.co.kr/.
On Loewen, see generally William W. Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The
New Face of Investment Arbitration, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003).
24. Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
majority opinion by Pierre Tercier and Albert Jan van den Berg, 4 August 2011;
dissent by Georges Abi-Saab, 28 October 2011. As is well-known to those familiar
with investor state arbitration, awards rendered pursuant to the rule of International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, a World Bank affiliate, are often
published with consent of the parties.
25. The Associazione per la Tutela degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini, often
called “Task Force Argentina” (or TFA) filed its claim on 14 September 2006. For
procedural reasons a Registration Notice by the ICSID Secretariat did not follow
until November 7, 2007.
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Abaclat case took a different direction from the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. The majority took jurisdiction over the collectively-filed
claims, while the dissenting arbitrator expressed concerns about the
appropriateness of such proceedings.26 Citing both Stolt-Nielsen and
AT&T Mobility, the dissent endorsed the reasoning in both judgments
as underscoring the fundamental differences between bilateral and
class representative proceedings, which, he wrote, required some
“special consent of the parties” not to be assumed from a simple
commitment to arbitrate.27
International arbitration between investors and host states
implicates a shift in the political labels of those for or against class
proceedings. Financial interests, considered as relatively
conservative in the sense of resisting uncompensated governmental
takings, urge investor-state arbitration beyond the traditional bilateral
paradigm. Any jurisdictional risks stemming from the atypical
dynamics of class proceedings seem outweighed by the prospect of
enhancing the vindication of contract rights.
In Abaclat the majority saw the “mass action” not as a matter not
of jurisdiction, but rather of procedural “admissibility” presenting
few comparisons to American-style class-action arbitration. The
majority emphasized that the tribunal had jurisdiction over each
individual claim, and found that no separate, specific consent
required with regard to the form of the proceeding. According to the
majority, “Assuming that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the
claims of several individual Claimants, it is difficult to conceive why
and how the Tribunal could [lose] such jurisdiction where the
number of Claimants outgrows a certain threshold.”28

D. TAXONOMY: CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATION AND JOINDER
For American and non-American audiences alike, confusion may
exist between “class” and “consolidated” arbitration.29 The former
26. Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
(Aug. 4, 2011).
27. Id. Abi-Saab Dissent, ¶¶ 150-53.
28. Id. Majority Award, ¶ 490.
29. On the distinction between consolidated and class proceedings, see
generally Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV.
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would normally be contemplated when stakes in any individual case
remain small enough to make bilateral arbitration impractical from a
cost standpoint. By contrast, consolidation implicates several cases
each of which would proceed on a stand-alone basis, but which
present related parties as well as common issues of law and fact,
making it more economical for the claims to be heard together by a
single tribunal.
In “class” arbitration, self-selected claimants represent others
entitled to similar or analogous recovery. Assuming the relevant
contract language can be construed to permit class arbitration, an
arbitral tribunal would normally need to decide whether class
proceedings justify themselves according to the types of factors
relevant in class actions brought in federal court. Such criteria
include not only common issues, but also a finding that the
representatives and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect
the class interests.
Consolidation, on the other hand, involves independent but related
actions, without any one individual or entity standing as
representative for others, even if each side engages a team of
common counsel. Consequently, concerns about the fairness of group
representation would normally be absent.30 All of the lawsuits would
otherwise go forward individually. Consolidation simply promotes
efficiency.31
The difference between “class” and “consolidated” proceedings
was recently addressed in an appellate decision involving insurance
arbitration, where the court essentially left the arbitral tribunal to
decide (as an initial matter, at least) whether to consolidate several
proceedings.32 Following Florida litigation by healthcare providers
against every Blue Cross insurance plan in the United States, a dozen
LITIG. 495 (1990); Richard Jeydel, Consolidation, Joinder and Class Actions, 57
DISPUTE RESOL. J. 2 (Nov. 2002 – Jan. 2003).
30. In judicially-ordered consolidation, a judge would normally have discretion
to consolidate without regard to the type of safeguards which impose themselves
on class proceedings, such as the adequacy of counsel. Compare consolidation
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42(a), with class actions
pursuant to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
31. See Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 24(a).
32. See Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. v.
BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2011).
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plans requested indemnity from their captive insurer pursuant to an
errors-and-omissions policy. Failing to get satisfaction, the plans
filed consolidated arbitration claims against the captive, which asked
a federal district court to order what it called “de-consolidation” of
the proceedings.
Declining to hear an appeal from a lower court decision appointing
a third arbitrator, and refusing to de-consolidate the proceedings, the
Court of Appeals addressed the special aspects of class arbitration.33
These included the importance of determining adequacy of
representation, and the prospect that a respondent might face one
large claim for aggregate damages rather than simply a multiplicity
of potential, yet unrealized, small arbitrations.
Had the case been brought on a “class” basis, the appellate court
seemed to accept that judicial intervention may have been
appropriate, to ascertain whether the parties had in fact agreed to
something other than bilateral arbitration. However, the proceedings
at issue merely consolidated several cases that would otherwise have
been brought individually, thus presenting no urgency to remove the
matter from arbitral determination, subject to whatever later judicial
review might be open under the Federal Arbitration Act for excess of
authority.
One final precision might be in order with respect to the exercise
of “joining” parties in arbitration, sometimes referred to as
“extending” the arbitration clause. Attempts to join parties to arbitral
proceedings might be made as part of an offensive strategy, by a
claimant seeking to add a respondent’s parent company in the hope
of insuring assets sufficient to satisfy any award. Or the tactic might
be defensive, by a respondent seeking the benefit of an arbitral clause
signed by an affiliate, as a prospect more appealing than an unwanted
33. In its attempt to persuade the Court of Appeals to hear the appeal, the
captive insurer had styled its application as a motion to compel arbitration, which
would have been easier under Section 16(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Arbitration Act,
which permits appeal only from orders denying petitions for arbitration. The Court
had little difficulty cutting through form to substance, and in so doing seemed to
enjoy finding support both in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS. In passing, Judge Easterbrook also cited President Abraham
Lincoln’s question about how many legs a donkey would have if we call its tail a
leg. Id. The answer, of course, was only four, since calling the tail a leg did not
make it one.
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American jury trial.34
In some instances the joinder might be pursued by reference to
explicit provisions of institutional arbitration rules,35 while in other
events may be pressed simply by reference to general principles of
alter ego, “corporate veil” piercing, or implied agency.36 In all
instances, however, the addition of a claimant or a respondent does
not change the fundamental nature of the arbitration itself.

II. AWARD VACATUR AND CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION
A. PARCEL TANKERS AND ANTI-TRUST
Few matters prove as slippery as the allocation of tasks between
judges and arbitrators in commercial disputes. A choice to arbitrate
implicates waiver of access to otherwise competent courts in favor of
adjudication which is both private and binding. Respect for this
bargain means that judges normally should not disturb an arbitrator’s
substantive conclusions.
34. The protean nature of collective arbitration has often been made even more
complex by the term “mass” proceedings, often pressed into service for
extraordinary events such as adjudication of Holocaust-related insurance claims
through the ICHEIC process conducted in London, or claims to Swiss bank
accounts through the Claims Resolution Tribunal in Zürich. See INTERNATIONAL
MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES (Howard M. Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir , eds.,
2007).
35. See, e.g., London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 21.1(h)
(1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/DisputeResolutionServices/LCIA
ArbitrationRules.aspx; International Chamber of Commerce Rules, art. 7 (2012),
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/
arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ (providing joinder procedures distinct from
those of Article 10 related to consolidation).
36. American courts, of course, are well aware of the various theories on
which non-signatories might be joined in arbitration. See Arthur Andersen v.
Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (addressing notions of third party beneficiaries).
For an intriguing cross-Channel debate on the matter, see Dallah Real Estate &
Tourism Holding Co. v. Gov’t of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46. Although the British
Supreme Court held that there was no justification to join the government of
Pakistan, an analogous decision by the Paris Cour d’appel came to the opposite
conclusion, dismissing a challenge to an award against the state. Cour d’appel
[CA] de Paris, Case No. 09-28533, Feb. 17, 2011. See generally William W. Park,
Non-Signatories and International Contract, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, ed., 2009).
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Unlike the merits of a dispute itself, however, an arbitrator’s
jurisdiction must necessarily fall within the province of judicial
review. No reason exists for a court to defer to arbitrators on matters
never given to them for decision. Courts understandably hesitate to
enforce decisions by arbitrators who have clearly ignored the
contours of their mandate.
This sensible delineation of tasks inheres in most modern
arbitration statutes, including the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
which empowers courts to vacate awards “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.”37 Award annulment would not be
appropriate, however, simply because a judge disagrees with the
award on questions of law or fact submitted to arbitration.38
The majority decision in Stolt-Nielsen,39 although paying lip
service to this division of labor, effectively ignored the distinction in
their disposition of a case brought against owners of ships commonly
known as Parcel Tankers, used to carry liquids. Alleging price-fixing
and other anti-competitive practices,40 the shippers that had chartered
the vessels requested a single proceeding to address their combined
claims, borrowing the term “class action arbitration” from American
court procedures. All shippers (the owners’ customers) had accepted
charter parties (leases for use of the vessels) which included similar
arbitration clauses.
Not surprisingly, the shippers would have seen benefit to
collective proceedings, permitting them to muster greater legal
firepower and to reduce legal costs which in turn would enhance the
value of bringing the litigation.41 By contrast, the owners preferred
bilateral litigation strategy, which would have the effect of reducing
the cost-benefit ration of the lawsuit for each claimant.
37. 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (1925).
38. With respect to foreign awards, Article V of the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention applies a similar principle, denying recognition if the
arbitration agreement was “not valid” or the award contains decisions “beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration.”
39. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
40. In a companion criminal case, Stolt-Nielsen itself had admitted to
engaging in an illegal cartel. United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d
586 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
41. See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003).
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After a district court had ordered the related actions to be heard
together,42 the parties agreed to constitute a tribunal pursuant to the
American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules on Class
Arbitration (“AAA Supplementary Rules”) to address whether the
various arbitrations could and should proceed on a class basis.43 In a
partial award, the arbitrators construed the arbitration clause to
permit class arbitration, which might be ordered at a subsequent
stage upon a finding of certain prerequisites, such as common
questions of law and fact among the class members. That path must
have seemed conducive to a more efficient process, with savings in
time and cost from grouping related claims into a single case.

B. EXCESS OF AUTHORITY
1. The “Silent” Clause
The asserted efficiencies in class arbitration, with savings from
combined claims, did not impress the ship owners, who sought to
vacate the award for excess of authority. Ultimately a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the arbitrators had exceeded their
authority by imposing personal policy views, rather than deciding
pursuant to applicable law.44 Accordingly, the case was remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s
opinion, namely vacatur of the award.
The Court based its conclusion on a somewhat unusual feature of
the case, which was a post-dispute stipulation concluded by the
parties confirming that their contracts were silent on the matter of
42. See In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 296 F.
Supp. 2d 1370, 1370-71 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
43. AnimalFeeds brought the claim on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated in a putative class action under FRCP Rule 23 against Stolt-Nielsen,
Odfjell, Jo Tankers, and Tokyo Marine. Id. at 1371; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
44. Justice Alito wrote:
It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the
agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’ that his
decision may be unenforceable. In that situation, an arbitration decision may be
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the arbitrator ‘exceeded [his]
powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make
public policy. In this case, we must conclude that what the arbitration panel did was
simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767-68.
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class action arbitrations, in the sense that “no agreement” had been
reached.
Significantly, the Court did not say that parties must agree
explicitly to class arbitration, but simply that the case at bar
implicated no agreement, whether express or implied. Indeed, the
Court added in a significant footnote “We have no occasion to decide
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed
to authorize class-action arbitration.”45 Consequently, not all
arbitration clauses which are silent on class actions need be
interpreted by federal courts as prohibiting class actions, at least
absent a stipulation like the one in Stolt-Nielsen to the effect of “no
agreement” on the matter.46
A strong dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg contended that the
arbitrators were simply doing what the parties had instructed them.
The AAA Supplementary Rules, accepted by all litigants,
empowered arbitrators to decide whether the dispute should proceed
on a class action basis.47
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, the dissent’s argument has
significant force. No question was raised about the bona fide of the
counsel representing the claimant shippers. All claimants appear to
have agreed to arbitration with all respondents, leaving open
however the question whether the arbitration should proceed on a
45. See id. at 1776 n.10.
46. See Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012). A group of retail sales employees filed a
discrimination claim against their employer. The Court of Appeals held that the
arbitrator did not exceed her authority in determining that arbitration agreement
permitted employees to proceed with their effort to certify class in arbitration
proceedings against employer.
47. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1777
(2010). Rule 3 of these AAA Supplementary Rules grants the arbitrators
jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitration might, as a matter of contract,
proceed on behalf of a class, assuming satisfaction of the relevant criteria for class
certification set forth in Rule 4, which parallel factors in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See American Arbitration Association, AAA’s Supplementary Rules
for Class Arbitration Rules 3 & 4, available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004129&_afrLoop=161453029
587710&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=fmy0ltmjz_171#%40%3F_afrWin
dowId%3Dfmy0ltmjz_171%26_afrLoop%3D161453029587710%26doc%3DADR
STG_004129%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dfmy0ltmjz_223
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see alsoFED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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bilateral or a collective basis. Given that arbitration remains a
creature of contract, there was nothing odd in the parties deciding to
craft the scope of questions to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal,
which through incorporation of the AAA Rules included
interpretation of controverted charter-party contracts. One side said
the contract language did permit class proceedings, to which “not so”
was effectively the other side’s reply.
Not all cases yield to such analysis however. One can imagine, for
example, significant complications from an agreement to arbitrate
the matter of class entitlement, but concluded by a self-appointed
representative which did not in fact speak for a class, a matter
discussed more fully below.
2. The Right Answer to the Wrong Question
In its zeal to send a signal on the admittedly problematic nature of
class action arbitration, the majority conflated two distinct matters.
The first relates to monitoring arbitral jurisdiction, which falls to
courts. The second concerns substantive merits of the parties’
dispute, which falls to arbitrators.48
The opinion by Justice Alito rightly noted the parties’ post-dispute
stipulation that the contract was silent in the sense of containing “no
agreement” on class action arbitration. However, the litigants had
unequivocally asked arbitrators, not judges to construe their ex ante
intent on class arbitration.49 Article 3 of the AAA Supplementary
Rules, titled “Construction of the Arbitration Clause,” provides the
arbitrators with an explicit grant of jurisdiction as follows:
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in
a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration
clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to
proceed on behalf of or against a class (the “Clause Construction
Award”).50

48. See generally William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine
Jurisdiction, in 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 55 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed.,
2007).
49. Brief in Opposition at 2, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130
S. Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010).
50. American Arbitration Association, supra note 47. Moreover, Rule 3
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The arbitrators were thus empowered by the parties to address
whether the arbitration clause permitted the case to proceed on behalf
of a class.51 The litigants moved that question to the realm of the
dispute’s substance, which under the FAA normally remains within
the purview of the arbitrators.
In essence, the majority gave the right answer to the wrong
question. The relevant inquiry facing the Court was not, “What did
the parties agree in general?” but the more limited issue, “What did
the parties agree to arbitrate?” By accepting the AAA Supplementary
Rules, the parties gave to the arbitrators the question of whether the
contract allowed class action arbitration, thus generally precluding
judicial second-guessing on that matter.52 Courts might still intervene
to monitor bias or lack of due process, but not to correct a simple
mistake in the arbitrators’ contract interpretation.53
The chief mischief of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its potential to decrease
the finality of commercial arbitration, defeating the parties’ aim that
their dispute be decided by arbitrators rather than courts. Few would
disagree that arbitrators must remain faithful to the parties’ contract,
not create new public policy.54 Unfortunately, the majority opinion
recognizes that such a determination will be considered an award subject to review
pursuant to the delineated grounds for vacatur, but no more, as provided in the
FAA. The point of Rule 3 is to construe the contract, as a threshold matter, to
determine whether the parties agreed to submit their dispute to class arbitration at
all.
51. The applicability of these AAA procedures was explicitly recognized by
the majority. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
52. For an example of a decision following this line of argument, see Southern
Comm. Serv., Inc. v. Thomas, 829 F. Supp 2d 1324 (N.D. GA 2011), in which the
District Court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because, “the
parties . . . specifically granted the arbitrator the power to interpret their agreement
and decide whether it authorized class actions, both in writing and by their
conduct.” Id. at 1337.
53. See John M. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Class Arbitration, 2011 AAA
Y.B. ON ARB. & L. 395, 407 (2011) (opining that “The Supreme Court simply felt
that the arbitrators got the answer wrong, but the statute provides no basis for a
court to correct a mere error on the part of arbitrators”); see also S. I. Strong,
Opening More Doors Than It Closes, 2010 LLOYD’S MAR. & CONSUMER L.Q. 565
(Nov. 2010), for a scholarly perspective on the effect of Stolt-Nielsen in future
cases.
54. The Stolt-Nielsen majority opinion at 1767-68 declared that the award
must be vacated because the tribunal simply “impose[d] its own view of sound
policy regarding class arbitration.”
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took that general proposition as an avenue to justify award
annulment simply because the arbitrators got it wrong on a question
submitted for their determination. In doing so, the Court ruled on a
substantive issue within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, thus exceeding
the judiciary’s own legitimate role in the process.
In this connection, one must again note what the Court did not do.
No suggestion was made that collective action constitutes a nonarbitrable process by reason of some public policy for which the
judiciary serves as guardian. Nor did the Court find that claimants’
counsel would not adequately represent the interests of all shippers in
the proceedings. Rather, the decision rested purely on a divergent
interpretation of the contract language, with the reviewing judges
reading the charter-parties differently from the arbitrators.
3. Substantive Merits vs. Arbitral Authority
In holding that the award should be vacated, the majority invoked
excess of authority by the arbitral tribunal, one of the limited
statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA.55 Under the facts of the
case, however, the Court may well have blurred the distinction
between excess of jurisdiction and simple mistake of law, dressing
the latter in the garb of the former.
True enough, articulating a robust definition of excess of authority
has often proved tenuous.56 On the basis that litigants do not
expressly empower arbitrators to make mistakes, at least one judge
has gone so far as to suggest that errors always constitute an excess
of authority.57
Such a stretch, however, ignores that the parties asked an
arbitrator, not a judge, to decide the case, thus assuming the risk that
55. The exclusivity of the FAA as the source for vacatur grounds was declared
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576 (2008).
56. Attempts to define jurisdiction sometimes bring to mind the line by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, admitting an inability to define “hard core”
obscenity but adding, “I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964).
57. The great English jurist Lord Denning once suggested (albeit in an
administrative context) that “Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes
outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.” See LORD
DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979).
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the arbitrator might get it wrong. Nothing in the FAA permits judges
to impose their own views on matters submitted to arbitration. The
integrity of the arbitral process requires not only that judges
scrutinize gateway questions related to the contours of the litigants’
agreement to arbitrate, but equally that courts respect the arbitrators’
decisions on issues given to them for adjudication.
One might draw a distinction between two types of legitimacy.
The first being legitimacy of the arbitral process, which might be
threatened by arbitrators who exceed their consent-based jurisdiction.
A second level of legitimacy relates to the role of the judiciary. A
court can and should intervene to ensure the procedural fairness of
hearings, in matters such as the right to be heard and respect for the
arbitrator’s mission. However, when courts begin second guessing an
arbitrator’s decision on the substance of the dispute entrusted to him
by the litigants, arbitration awards cease to have the bargained-for
finality expected by the litigants.
In this context, one may recall words used from an earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decision addressing a dispute between a New York
merchant and an Illinois store owner before arbitrators who
ultimately awarded damages to the ill-treated storekeeper. Having
lost in arbitration, the unhappy New Yorker succeeded in having the
award set aside by a lower court. The Supreme Court reversed with
the following reasoning:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of
the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity
will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course
would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary]
in place of the judges chosen by the parties [the arbitrators], and would
make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.58

To extend jurisdictional analysis further than allowed pursuant to
the FAA would permit any unhappy loser in a fair proceeding to
renege on the bargain to arbitrate simply when a decision proves not
to their liking.
There is nothing unusual in saying that parties express their intent
to arbitrate matters which might otherwise be jurisdictional in nature.
58. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855).

2012]

POLITICS OF CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION

857

For example, allegations that the signature in an arbitration clause
had been forged would normally give rise to a judicial review. Yet it
would always be up to the parties to agree that the allegation of
forgery should be arbitrated,59 in which case the arbitrator would be
the one to determine the genuineness of the signature.60
At some point, of course, arbitrators might simply invent a legal
standard informed only by their personal policy preferences.61 In
such an instance, they would be exceeding their authority and
detracting from arbitral legitimacy.
The facts of Stolt-Nielsen, however, do not lend themselves to
painting the arbitrators as such wild cards. Although the Court’s
aversion to class arbitration proceedings may be understandable, the
parties asked the arbitrators, not the courts, to construe their
agreement by their adoption of the AAA Supplementary Rules. The
arbitrators’ understanding of the law had been made on the basis of
the earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision where a mere plurality of the
Court held that determinations on consolidation were for the
arbitrators themselves. 62 The legacy of this case was anything but
clear. None of the four opinions commanded a majority.
Although stressing that the award was not yet “ripe” for review,
the opinion by Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the effect of the
agreement to apply the AAA Supplementary Rules. Her dissent
notes, “The parties’ supplemental agreement, referring the class59. With respect to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate (such as
raised by the allegations of forgery), a separate post-dispute agreement to arbitrate
would normally be needed to confer arbitral jurisdiction. By contrast, with respect
to procedural matters (such as respect for time limits) the parties might well confer
arbitral authority in a single contract containing a clear mandate to arbitrate. See
Howsam v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (addressing the right to interpret a
requirement that arbitration be filed within six years after “the occurrence or event
giving rise to the dispute”).
60. Such delegation of jurisdictional authority in a separate agreement is
exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry
of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 All E. R.
823, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 286 (QB Comm. Ct.) .
61. The sting in the majority’s vacatur of the award lies in the line, “what the
arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding
class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1767-68 (2010).
62. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, undoubtedly empowered the
arbitrators to render their clause-construction decision. That scarcely
debatable point should resolve this case.”63 Put differently, the job of
construing the contract’s scope on the matter of class arbitration had
been expressly conferred on arbitrators, not judges.

C. OPT-IN FOR CLASS MEMBERS
The calculus for judicial intervention changes, however, if no
subsequent agreement exists to refer the matter to construction
pursuant to the AAA Supplementary Rules. Under the factual matrix
of Stolt-Nielsen, everyone had in fact signed arbitration agreements.
In such circumstances, the dangers, milder in magnitude when
speaking in relative terms, were simply that arbitrators might
erroneously presume an intent to permit collective (rather than
bilateral) proceedings among entities that had already consented to
renouncing their recourse to courts. The greater disruption lurks in
the possible extension of class proceedings to include persons who
never signed arbitration agreements at all, most likely the next step
for those who press to import true American-style class proceedings
into arbitration.64
The AAA Supplementary Rules provide criteria for class
63. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780. The plurality felt that the arbitrator should
decide whether the parties’ agreement allowed for class action arbitration. Justice
Stevens concurred with the outcome but did not endorse its reasoning. The dissent
by Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the parties’ contract demonstrated no
consent to class action arbitration. The dissent by Justice Thomas noted that the
case originated before South Carolina states courts, and contended that the FAA
did not apply to state proceedings. In the context of the point made by Justice
Thomas, it is interesting that Stolt-Nielsen implicated a maritime matter, falling
within the purview of federal rather than state law.
64. Statutory court-ordered consolidation of arbitral proceedings is a different
matter, given that all parties would presumably be subject to the relevant judicial
jurisdiction. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (2010), allowing
consolidation as provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which in
Rule 42 permits joinder of actions “involving a common question of law or fact.”
Mass. R. Civ. P. 42 (2008). The provision was applied in New England Energy v.
Keystone Shipping, 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988), which held that a federal district
court could grant consolidation pursuant to Massachusetts state law where the
parties’ agreement was silent on such matter. See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, §
7N1/2 (1998), requiring non-voluntary arbitration of claims over allegedly
defective vehicles.
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certification, setting forth factors that largely parallel those in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. If arbitrators have found
that the contract permits class action arbitration, they will proceed to
determine whether the various proceedings should go forward on a
class basis. Pursuant to prerequisites in Article 4 of those
Supplementary Rules, one or more claimants may represent a class
only if each of the following conditions is met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; (5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class; and (6) each class member has entered
into an agreement containing an arbitration clause which is substantially
similar to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other
class members.

The final prerequisite of Rule 4(6) speaks of each class member
having entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause
substantially similar to the one signed by the class representative.
The sounder approach to such language will be to require a true
bilateral arbitration clause, not simply a unilateral post-dispute “optin” process. Lacking reciprocity, a unilateral “opt-in” would derogate
from the abecedarian principle that arbitration (unlike court
proceedings) presupposes genuine consent, not simply post-dispute
attachment to a class for litigation convenience.
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, all owners and all customers had
agreed to arbitrate with each other through clauses in the charterparties.65 No question had been raised about the good faith or
adequacy of the counsel representing the class in proceedings which
simply moved things from bilateral to multilateral proceedings,
without deeming into life an agreement to arbitrate where none had
existed.
Class arbitration would change dramatically, however, if a
unilateral “opt-in” process were to bring into the arbitration potential
claimants with which respondents had never concluded any
65. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
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arbitration agreement at all. Like marriage, commercial arbitration
implicates mutual consent, not an open-ended option to be exercised
by a host of partners.

III. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
AND CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
A. AT&T MOBILITY AND THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION
In Stolt-Nielsen an arbitral award had been rendered, with the
courts coming into the act to second guess the arbitrators’ decision.
By contrast, judges may sometimes preclude arbitrators from ever
hearing a matter at all, as happened when the validity of class actions
waivers was called into question in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. 66
In a consumer complaint against the manufacturer of cell phones,
the standard-form sales contracts provided for arbitration but
prohibited class proceedings. Relying on an earlier California
judicial ruling striking down such prohibitions as unconscionable,
the district court refused to compel arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempted state rules barring class-action waivers. Whether
right or wrong, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia tended to
obscure intellectually rigorous debate by suggesting that any switch
from bilateral to class arbitration “sacrificed the principal
advantage of arbitration—its informality.”67 He then noted that
class arbitration requires procedural formality, to ensure adequate
representation of absent class members, notice to absent members,
and an opportunity to opt out, before concluding that Congress
would not have left the imposition of such procedural requirements
to an arbitrator.68
One can only speculate on where, in the Federal Arbitration Act
or its legislative history, support might be found for such a single-

66. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 563 U.S. -(2011).
67. 131 S.Ct. at 1751.
68. The majority also noted, quite rightly, the risk of error increases during
class proceedings, yet glossed over the many high-stakes arbitrations that already
occur.
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dimension view of the arbitral process, particularly in a world
with a multitude of publications witnessing to arbitration of large
multinational contract disputes and the increasingly public field of
investor-state arbitration pursuant to bilateral investment treaties
and free trade agreements. On its face at least, the Federal
Arbitration Act says simply that arbitration agreements will be
enforced according to their terms, whether such agreements relate
to big contracts or small.
A sounder underpinning for the decision might have rested on
the observation that the state-law doctrine invalidating classaction waivers (the so-called “Discovery Bank” rule) required
certain categories of disputes to be litigated in court, rather than
arbitrated. It was precisely this type of state “non-arbitrability”
rules that the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to preempt.69
Although Justice Scalia did not provide much guidance on
whether “manifest disregard of the law” continued as a separate
ground for award vacatur, his opinion did cite the limited nature
of judicial review as another ground for invalidating classaction waivers. According to the majority opinion, “We find it
hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that
Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a
decision.”70
The thoughtful concurrence by Justice Thomas provided what
may be a more persuasive approach, looking first to Federal
Arbitration Act Section 2 which makes an arbitration agreement
valid except on grounds that may exist for contract revocation.
He read that provision in tandem with Section 4, which calls for
courts to compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.” Construing the two sections together, the
concurrence suggests that only state law contract defenses
concerning formation of the arbitration agreement (such as fraud
or duress) could serve as a basis to decline enforcement of the
69. Id. at 1752. The opinion by Justice Scalia did mention that Section 10 of
the Federal Arbitration Act “focuses on misconduct rather than mistake” thus
perhaps suggesting that any residual “manifest disregard” must be found as a
subset of the excess of authority.
70. Id.
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clause.71
The dissent by Justice Breyer stressed the advantages of class
arbitration, and argued that the California rule on waivers fell
within the role accorded to state law in determining the validity
of arbitration agreements.72 Asking rhetorically what rational
lawyer would have agreed to represent the named claimants in
the case, for the possibility of recovering $30.22 in damages, the
dissent concluded that the alternative to class action would not
be millions of individual actions, but none at all.73

B. LOWER COURT REACTIONS
1. Amex Merchants
Such decisions on class arbitration have already resulted in pushback from lower courts. In a multiple-stage antitrust case brought by
merchants against a charge-card issuer, the Second Circuit
invalidated class-action waivers in arbitration even after two remands
for reconsideration.74
The named claimants, companies in California and New York as
well as a national trade association, sought to represent all merchants
which had agreed to accept Amex cards. Although happy for the
business from “charge” cards (simply a means of payment), the
merchants objected to having to honor “credit” cards permitting
customers to finance purchases over time, apparently issued to a lessaffluent group of customers than the charge card holders. Claimants
argued that the Amex “Honor All Cards” policy constituted an illegal
“tying” arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The American Express card acceptance agreements allowed either
side to resolve claims by arbitration. However, the contracts also
provided that the choice of arbitration by either side precluded the
71. Id. at 1754.
72. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. In re American Express Merchants Litigation, (“Amex I”), 554 F.3d 300
(2d Cir. 2009); In Re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex II”), 634
F.3d 187 (2d Circ. 2011); In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex
III”), 667 F.3d 204(2d Cir. 2012).
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merchant from participating “in a representative capacity or as a
member of any class of claimants” during the arbitration
proceedings.
Rightly or wrongly, the appellate court found that the high cost of
“bilateral” arbitration would effectively preclude vindication of
statutory rights. On the first reconsideration, directed in light of StoltNielsen, as well as its second reconsideration, following AT&T
Mobility, the Second Circuit found its original analysis unaffected,
and declared the arbitration clause unenforceable. Relying on
testimony of an economist who opined that the cost of an economic
antitrust study might fall between “several thousand dollars” and “in
excess of $1 million” the Court found the arbitration clause
unenforceable.75
An order to arbitrate on a class-action basis was not an option in
light of Stolt-Nielsen, which requires agreement on the matter. Thus
the Second Circuit simply concluded that the arbitration clause itself
was unenforceable, and remanded to the district court with
instructions to deny the motion to compel arbitration. In doing so the
appellate court was careful not to suggest that all class-action
waivers were to be deemed per se unenforceable. Rather, its analysis
rested on the proposition that in the instant case the only
economically feasible means for enforcing rights under competition
law via class action. If the arbitration clause precluded such
proceedings, then the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.
Such an approach leaves litigants in a difficult position. If a
contract contains a class-action waiver, a judge is unable to compel
class proceedings. Yet the same judge might feel unable to grant a
motion for non-class arbitration, considering bilateral proceedings to
be unconscionable because the cost denies claimant an ability to
enforce statutory rights on an individual basis. The dilemma is
certain to stimulate practitioners to focus more on drafting arbitration
clauses,76 whether within the framework of consumer transactions or
75. In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex III”), 667 F.3d 204,
212 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing testimony from one Gary L. French, Ph.D.).
76. See Paul Friedland & Michael Ottolenghi, Drafting Class Action Clauses
After Stolt-Nielsen, 65 DISPUTE RESOL. J. 22 (May-October 2010), who suggest
explicitly addressing the question of class action arbitration in the arbitration
clause to avoid any confusion resulting from how future courts will interpret Stolt-
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business-to-business contracts.77
2. Choice-of-Law Principles
In an interesting case decided as this essay goes to press, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the interaction of class action
waivers and choice-of-law rules.78 A federal district court sitting in
the state of Washington had refused to compel arbitration and struck
down an arbitration clause requiring bilateral arbitration, finding the
clause “substantively” unconscionable pursuant to a Washington
state law invalidating class action waivers in arbitration.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit held that federal law preempted state
law invalidating the class-action waiver. However, the case was
remanded so that the lower court could examine procedural
unconscionability, related to general contract defenses such as fraud
and duress, not specific to arbitration.
The parties’ agreement had provided for application of the law of
the state of the plaintiff’s billing address. Consequently, the district
court was directed to examine the choice-of-law rules in Washington
applicable to the procedural unconscionability arguments, which had
not earlier been addressed.

IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Evaluating the recent class-action cases remains a daunting task,
both descriptively and normatively. If scholars could predict the
future they would likely be in another business. In particular, the
peculiar facts of Stolt-Nielsen limit its precedential value, given that

Nielsen.
77. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen were
sophisticated businesses with sufficient resources and experience to bargain, rather
than parties subject to contracts of adhesion. Whether this argument cuts in favor
or against a presumption to allow class action arbitration remains an open question.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010).
78. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012), reversing the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington. Federal courts exercising
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship apply the choice-of-law rules of the
forum state. Thus the district court was directed to look to the conflicts principles
of the state of Washington.
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the decision rests on an explicit “no agreement” stipulation not likely
to be repeated if the parties resisting class arbitration have competent
counsel.
The great risk of Stolt-Nielsen is that its approach will be pressed
into service to justify award annulment in cases where judges differ
with arbitrators on the substantive outcome of a case. Indeed, the
decision enhances the prospect that arbitration will become mere
foreplay to litigation, given how the Supreme Court ignored the
litigants’ explicit agreement to submit to arbitration the very question
of whether class proceedings were authorized.
Likewise, the case will provide little guidance on factors that
might demonstrate the parties’ intent to permit class arbitration. In a
key footnote, the majority in Stolt-Nielsen punts to future decisions
the important question of how to define the contours of an agreement
to class action proceedings, stating, “We have no occasion to decide
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed
to authorize class-action arbitration.”79
Nor will the Court’s discussion assist in addressing the much
vexed matter of whether “manifest disregard of the law” continues to
exist as an independent ground for review of arbitral awards.80 StoltNielsen says that if such a standard exists, it was satisfied under the
facts of the case, thus leaving the vitality of the doctrine open to
question.81 In AT&T Mobility Justice Scalia does provide a
79. See Stolt-Nielsen 130 S. Ct. at 1782, n.10.
80. First introduced in dictum of the 1953 U.S. Supreme Court decision Wilko
v. Swann, “manifest disregard of the law” has raised considerable concern in some
quarters. See, e.g., the opinion by Chief Judge Posner in Baravati v. Josephthal,
Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7 Cir. 1994), which refers to the doctrine as
having been “[c]reated ex nihilo [as] a nonstatutory ground for setting aside arbitral
awards.” Judge Posner, continued: “If [manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle
review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modern
law of arbitration. If it is intended to be synonymous with the statutory formula
that it most nearly resembles—whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers’—it
is superfluous and confusing.” Id.
81. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3: “We do not decide whether
‘manifest disregard’ survives … as an independent ground for review or as a
judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”
The Court then continued, “Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we
find it satisfied for the reasons that follow [in the majority opinion].” Whether
“manifest disregard of the law” exists as an independent ground for judicial review
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tantalizing hint, saying that Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
“focuses on misconduct rather than mistake” thus perhaps suggesting
that any residual “manifest disregard” must be found as a subset of
the excess of authority.82
Whether judges outside the United States will stay court actions in
conflict with class arbitration remains equally unclear. In the context
of litigation in France or England, for example, it is far from evident
that a court would refuse to hear a claim merely because the
respondent, benefiting from no pre-existing arbitration agreement,
had simply opted into American class arbitration.

V. CONCLUSION: EFFICIENCY AND CONSENT
Debate over class action arbitration highlights a stubborn tension
in binding private dispute resolution. Collective action sometimes
promotes a form of efficiency in the vindication of rights which
enhances arbitration’s role in promoting economic cooperation. Yet
the legitimacy of the arbitral process depends on having claims
decided in a manner consistent with the limits of arbitral authority
contained in the parties’ consent, respect for which does not always
marry well with consent-based legitimacy.
Human nature being what it is, the character of the substantive
claims to be decided often affects how competing considerations get
weighed in resolving this tension between efficiency and consentbased legitimacy. Rightly or wrongly, claims of consumer fraud and
employment discrimination evoke different “a priori” sympathies
from those triggered by actions to enforce the rights of creditors or
investors. Not infrequently, political, social and cultural
predispositions affect how we balance costs and benefits of rival
reactions to a perceived injustice.
In the domestic American context, collective arbitration may pit
consumers against manufacturers, workers against their bosses,
shippers against vessel owners. For the claimants, class proceedings
provide as a more efficient path to recover damages for alleged
fraud, unfair dismissal, or overcharging. Not surprisingly, the
of awards was put into doubt by the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Hall Street
Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
82. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
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manufacturer, employer or ship owner, on the receiving end of the
complaints, may see the process as a form of litigation terrorism
conducted mainly to benefit the plaintiffs’ lawyers.
A different color often attaches to collective arbitration in the
international realm. The claimants might be well-heeled bondholders
alleging expropriation of financial holdings by a developing
country,83 or venerable institutional investors asserting shareholders’
rights against a large foreign oil company said to have close ties with
the Kremlin.84
In each instance, arbitrators asked to interpret the contracts, as
well as judges who review the awards and scholars who volunteer
comment, may tend to evaluate procedural constraints of party
consent in light of conscious or unconscious ideological inclinations.
In this context, recourse to imprecise terms such as “left” and “right”
will foster helpful analysis only if those labels serve as categories
which beg for, rather than provide, enlightenment.
In the end, however, the health of arbitration will depend more on
honest and mature debate than on ideology or dogma. In resolving
tensions between efficiency and legitimacy, the soundest suggestions
will remain imperfect, given that any proposal rests on words
connected sequentially even while the reality of the conflict remains
obstinately simultaneous in nature.
During the proceedings, arbitrators must be vigilant to respect
constraints in the parties’ agreement that might limit the format of
arbitration to individual rather than collective claims. After the
arbitration itself has ended, judges reviewing the award should
remember that in the post-award stage of the arbitral process, the role
of law consists principally in promoting the rule of law, in the sense
of respect for fundamental to procedural fairness. Judicial
enthusiasm for insuring the “right result” in contract construction
should not normally outweigh the deference due to the arbitrators’
good faith resolution of the questions entrusted to them by the
litigants.

83. See discussion of the Abaclat case, supra note 24.
84. See JSC Surgutneflegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 167
Fed. Appx. 266 (2d Cir. 2006).

